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A Parable of Compliance issues and their 
link to EBFM outcomes.  
.  
By John G. Pope1 and Charlotte T. Weber2. 
 
This is a scientific parable mostly based on an investigation of Compliance issues and 
their link to EBFM that arose as part of the MAREFRAME Atlantos CASE STUDY. 
Highlights are 
 Cost of Compliance is proposed as a useful statistic for assessing any proposed 
change in management in any fishery. 
 Methods of how it might be calculated draws on approaches developed for 
the MAREFRAME Atlantos Case Study. 
 It provides a succinct summary of the proceedings of an important meeting on 
compliance issues and EBFM held with Atlanterro Stakeholders and the 
Atlantis Board of Commerce.  
 It suggests how its specific techniques could be adapted to other areas and 
gives an example of the transfer of advanced technical methods from Atlantos 
Scientists to the (backward) North Sea Case Study. 
 It notes the common problems of including Atlanterro and other Stakeholders 
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Abstract. 7 
Fisheries Stakeholders are understandably most concerned with immediate problems. Often these 8 
problems are related to proposed rule changes. This short term focus is in itself a serious problem for 9 
introducing Ecosystems Based Fisheries Management (EBFM), which is typically seen as a long-term 10 
approach. However, the short-term response of fishers to rule changes may well have long-term 11 
consequences by either changing their fishing patterns or by changing the extent to which fishers obey the 12 
rules. Either response could have a long-term impact on achieving EBFM.  13 
This is a difficult area to study because it involves fishers’ unrecorded behaviour, but it is probably the case 14 
that many of the responses of fishers may be influenced by how much it costs them to change their 15 
behaviour to comply with new rules. Changes in behaviour may include changes in fishing gear, fishing 16 
grounds or fishing effort. To examine these possibilities requires that a short-term area based model is 17 
available that can consider the costs and consequences of changes in fishing gear or fishing ground. There 18 
can be technical difficulties with doing this, but this paper attempts to show how these might be overcome. 19 
However, given the sensitive nature of compliance issues, these approaches are applied to the mythical 20 
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fisheries of Atlantis rather than to real life fisheries. Initial results of the model applied to the important 21 
Atlantean Fishing fleets are shown, and most importantly how much compliance might cost in these cases 22 
is indicated (i.e. the profit forgone by complying). Pursuing this scientific parable further also allows an 23 
open discussion of ways to mitigate non compliance. It suggests how stakeholders and managers might be 24 
able to improve trust and compliance by adding fishers’ information to the scientific information used in 25 
models of compliance to increase transparency and by identifying and encouraging responsible behaviours 26 
that improve compliance and thus the chances of EBFM being successful. The purpose of the parable is to 27 
spark discussion and wider thinking about fisheries management and compliance in an EBFM context. 28 
 29 
Key Words: EBFM, Stakeholder views, Fishers’ Behaviour, Area Based models, Atlantis Fable, Compliance. 30 
1 Introduction 31 
1.1 Preamble 32 
In 2014 the EU funded a large research project (MareFrame) to remove the barriers that prevent a more 33 
widespread use of the EBFM in Europe. At the onset of the MareFrame project North Sea Stakeholders 34 
expressed the wish that work should focus on   35 
 The need to achieve Fmsy1.  36 
 The Landing Obligation.  37 
 The Risks of Incompatible Regulation.  38 
In practice the first of these topics was most congruent with the pre-agreed work plan of MareFrame and 39 
thus commanded the bulk of time and resources. However, it was wished in some way to consider the 40 
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other two stakeholder concerns. Undoubtedly, it would have been best to base this on a real system and 41 
indeed preliminary work was started on this using the small mesh beam trawl fisheries of the Netherlands 42 
as an example and work done on this is shown in the results. However, to complete this would have 43 
required the ability to visit and have extensive consultations with Dutch Stakeholders and human and travel 44 
resources that were not available under MareFrame. Hence such an endeavour has to await another time. 45 
Consequently a thought experiment is presented to both demonstrate what might be a first way forward 46 
for what is certainly a complex problem and to air some of the opinions, concerns, considerations and 47 
opportunities that might come into play when Stakeholders are involved in such a process.  48 
Hence in this paper, the authors use a scientific parable that will take the reader to a mythical world—the 49 
EU state of Atlantis. The story revolves around an imaginary fishery placed somewhere in the North 50 
Atlantic, which faces ‘real-world’ issues of a recently introduced discard ban and associated concerns about 51 
compliance. The purpose of this ‘mythical approach’ is to discuss the delicate and sometimes controversial 52 
issues of compliance freely. Therefore, despite the (at time) whimsical storyline, all ideas brought forward 53 
in this paper are meant earnestly, with the aim to spark discussion and wider thinking about fisheries 54 
management and compliance in an EBFM context. 55 
 56 
1.2 Rationale 57 
Most proposals for long-term fisheries management suppose that fishers will comply with the proposed 58 
regulations. History however suggests that this has not always been the case. Clearly the extent of 59 
compliance with regulations will affect their outcomes and therefore the success or failure of measures 60 
designed to further Ecosystem Based Fisheries Management (EBFM). The literature suggests that there are 61 
multiple factors that influence fishers’ willingness to comply with regulations or that tempt them not to 62 
comply.  63 
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Rule compliance is often analysed from an economic perspective and much of today’s fisheries 64 
management is grounded in such economic theory, where fishers are seen as self-interested, rational 65 
agents that strive to maximise their economic utility, while decimating the resource if offered open access 66 
(Gordon, 1954). In this case, individuals will comply if the cost of breaking the rule is higher than the utility, 67 
while the opposite case will lead to non-compliance. This is in the same line of thought as Hardin’s 68 
influential piece on the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968). Based on these assumptions, the 69 
behaviour of individuals is determined by a system of reward and punishment (Raakjær Nielsen, 2003). This 70 
understanding narrows down individuals’ compliance behaviour to a purely economic incentive which can 71 
be controlled through monitoring, surveillance and enforcement. Ostrom’s work expanded this 72 
understanding and introduced the idea of how reciprocity, reputation, and trust affect people’s behaviour 73 
(Ostrom, 1998). Further social, cultural, and political factors like norms, perceptions, community, 74 
transparency and legitimacy have also been found to impact fishers’ behaviour (Hønneland, 1999; Ostrom, 75 
1998; Raakjær Nielsen, 2003). Therefore, individuals’ decisions to comply can be influenced by both 76 
tangible and intangible motivations, like moral obligations and social influence, as suggested by the 77 
literature and empirical evidence. In such cases, fishers can show cooperation even though this results in 78 
economic loss, just to `do the right thing´, and individuals are more non-compliant the more their 79 
community and peers are non-compliant or vice-versa (Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999). This may mean that 80 
non-compliance mitigations would have to involve more complex considerations, such as increasing fishers’ 81 
perceptions of the legitimacy of policies and regulations, introducing equitable procedures for imposing 82 
restrictions and empowering participants through co-management, for example (Sutinen and Kuperan, 83 
1999). At other times, the issues at hand can be as simple as a lack of understanding of the rules and fishers 84 
breaking rules unknowingly.  85 
For this reason, the solutions to non-compliance issues are very dependent on the framing of the problem, 86 
that is the factors leading to, or preventing, rule compliance (Jagers et al., 2012). In return, the diversity of 87 
factors potentially influencing compliance exacerbates the development of generalizable and suitable 88 
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mitigation and counter measures. So how can we start to understand the costs of compliance—the profit 89 
forgone by complying—and its long-term consequences to ecosystem-based fisheries management? 90 
Despite the multiple factors, it seems likely that the cost of compliance is potentially the most important 91 
factor to consider or at least a first step in the process. However, compliance is often a sensitive and time 92 
consuming subject to address for a real fishery. Consequently in this paper, we develop a scientific parable 93 
based around the mythical EU state of Atlantis. 94 
1.3 History:- Atlantis Resurgum 95 
Far away and long ago in a parallel universe (that exists as a Riemann surface like extension to the real 96 
Earth), Atlantis had slipped below the waves. However, following intense volcanic activity, it rose again 97 
from the depths in AD i18502. It is situated  in the North Atlantic Ocean on the south Rockall Bank 98 
(57.24⁰+i720N⁰, 19.36⁰+i360⁰W). Ownership of the newly emerged land was initially disputed between the 99 
countries of iEurope. But, the Atlantean Government in exile, a covert cabal that had existed since those 100 
earlier classical times (with secret HQ on Malta, the Atlanteans being a Phoenician people) laid historical 101 
claims to the resurgent land mass. Their claims to sovereignty, perhaps cynically supported by the leading 102 
maritime power of the day and backed up by dubious archaeology, were finally accepted and 103 
internationally ratified by the Atlantis Treaty. The Government of Atlantis in exile thus claimed and settled 104 
the land of Atlantis. Its population subsequently swelled to about 1 million. It is a devotedly Catholic 105 
democracy but perhaps not surprisingly given its cabalistic roots, anachronisms remain such as the 106 
matriarchally descended High Priestess of Astarte remaining the titular head of state (deemed by many to 107 
be of divine origin). Although trading and banking are now the predominant industries of Atlantis, fishing 108 
and fish processing were the pioneer industries and are consequently hallowed in the Atlantean psyche.  109 
 110 
 Background to the Fisheries Management of Atlantis. 111 
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As part of the initial International accommodation, signatories of the Atlantis treaty (signed in St Petersburg 112 
i1868) retained rights to share Alantean waters (somewhat like those subsequently granted signatories of 113 
the Svalbard Treaty, 1925) and these rights were recognised when Atlantis extended its EEZ under UNLOS 114 
in i1997. Atlantis joined the iEU in i1999 and Atlantean waters are fished both by Atlantis based fisheries, 115 
by fleets of other iEU countries and by fleets of some non iEU signatories of the Atlantis Treaty. However, in 116 
recent years fishing by non Atlantean fisheries has become uncommon but all fishing is subject to the CFP 117 
of the iEU. Figure 1 shows the topography of the Atlantean shelf. Fish resources in Atlantean waters, being 118 
toward the northern end of the Boreal-Lusitanian province, are not dissimilar to those about the Faroe 119 
plateau or the Northern North Sea and the fisheries are conducted with similar fishing methods to those 120 
areas.  121 
Traditionally, the Atlatean Fishers, having Mediterranean ancestry, organised their management on a Guild 122 
like basis. However, membership of the iEU meant its one size fits all management in the Atlantic has 123 
somewhat superseded these earlier approaches though some traditional management rules still persist and 124 
these traditional rules are religiously observed by Atlantean fishers. Atlantean fisheries follow a restricted 125 
vessel licensing system based on traditional usage rights but this is overlaid with an iEU imposed system of 126 
TACs. ITQs have not been adopted in Atlantis.  127 
More recently the iEU has striven to introduce ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM) to Atlantis 128 
as to other iEU regions. This aims to account for all factors within a fisheries system in a holistic and 129 
integrated fashion. The outcomes from this approach are: more precautionary management 130 
recommendations, consideration of non-target species, addressing trade-offs among sectors and catch 131 
allocation, improved short- and long-term economics for participants, and long-term sustainability (Link, 132 
2010). Of course not all Atlanteans viewed these changes as beneficial but the Government of Atlantis had 133 
little choice but to accept this aspect of the iCFP. 134 
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Recently, the landing obligation (LO) of the i2013 Common Fisheries Policy, i.e. a discard ban, was 135 
introduced into iEU and Atlantean fisheries and will be fully implemented by 2019. With this regulation in 136 
place, discarding, i.e. returning catch to the sea, of over-quota, unwanted and undesirable catch will no 137 
longer be an option. This has raised concerns of the risk of early closures in fisheries due to what is referred 138 
to as the “choke-species” effect, which occurs when the quota of one species is exhausted before those of 139 
others. This presents a particular problem for mixed-fisheries, where it can be difficult to target or avoid 140 
single species as many are caught together (Mortensen et al., 2018). Such a discard ban can have large 141 
associated costs in terms of drastic reductions of long-term profits. This could have a strong impact on 142 
fishers compliance, as discarding practices have been found to be most closely linked to economic 143 
incentives (Simons et al., 2015). 144 
Atlantean fisheries are based upon a mixture of Boreal and Lusitanian species. A particular concern is the 145 
round fish fisheries for cod, haddock and saithe, which are largely fished by Atlantis based fishers.  146 
In Atlantis, fishers and scientists have a long history of liaising, and it is common practice to address any 147 
fisheries issues directly through dialogue between industry and science. The Atlantean traditionally 148 
involved in these discussions include The Atlantis Board of Commerce (ABC) and the Atlantis Regional 149 
Advisory Council (ARAC). Members of the ARAC include Atlantean (environmental) Non-Governmental 150 
Organizations (NGOs), Fishers organizations, fishers unions, the transport federation, the High Priestess of 151 
Astarte, fish processors, a few selected consumers, and governmental scientists from the social and natural 152 
sciences.  153 
Given the current changes in policy, the Atlantean case study was brought into being as part of the EU-154 
funded MareFrame project, a project aiming to support co-creation processes for ecosystem-based 155 
fisheries management solutions. As part of the MareFrame Atlantean case study, the Atlantean 156 
stakeholders were invited for an initial consultation regarding the concerns of the newly introduced LO in 157 
Atlantis. In the course of the consultation it became clear that:  158 
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1. Atlanteans were concerned to achieve EBFM. 159 
2. However, their attention was necessarily focused on short-term issues. In particular they were 160 
concerned with the impending Landings Obligation (LO) and its possible effect on compliance. 161 
3. The Atlantis Board of Commerce (ABC), which participated in these consultations, noting that reductions 162 
in compliance would have implications for the long-term success of EBFM measures, requested that the 163 
MareFrame Atlantean Case Study conduct a preliminary scoping study into the potential extent and cost 164 
implications of non-compliance in the context of the Atlantean offshore demersal round-fish fishery. 165 
1.4 Objective 166 
This paper provides the initial response of the MareFrame Atlantean Case Study team to the request by the 167 
ABC. It aims:  168 
1) To set out the likely short-term economic scope for non-compliance in the Atlantean round-fish 169 
fishery. 170 
2) To record the results of discussions held with ABC and the Atlantis Regional Advisory Council 171 
(ARAC) on ways forward to encourage compliance. 172 
  173 
2 Materials and Methods 174 
2.1 Approach:  175 
Compliance is a complex amalgam of economic, social and governance factors. However, assuming that 176 
non-compliance is driven by economic forces rather than by bad habits or being anti-authority, the cost of 177 
compliance (the profit forgone by complying) becomes the measure of the driver that may lead to non-178 
compliant behaviour. In defining this measure no judgment is made as to the likely behaviour of fishers 179 
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under the proposed Landings Obligation (LO) in Atlantean waters or elsewhere. Rather it is a way to scale 180 
“the wages of sin” for a particular case and thus to appreciate the strength of temptation not to comply.  181 
To predict the size of the cost of compliance (in the short term) with a discard ban (AKA Landing Obligation 182 
- LO) requires that the economic consequences of compliant and non-compliant behaviours be calculated. 183 
The most obvious behavioural differences between compliant and non-compliant behaviours might be in 184 
choice of fishing gear adopted, the areas fished and the amount of fishing effort deployed. Compliant 185 
behaviour, which would be landing all fish species caught up to their given quota, might involve the choice 186 
of mesh-sizes that reduced the proportion of unwanted sizes of various species and/or avoiding fishing 187 
grounds where those sizes of those species are prevalent. Non-compliant behaviours would continue 188 
fishing with existing or smaller mesh gears, seek the most profitable grounds and illicitly discard unwanted 189 
catch. In the case of the Atlantean fishing grounds the wider and more productive fishing banks are 190 
situated off the East Coast, which are more sheltered and more accessible to the main harbour and market 191 
at Atlanto Porto (see Fig 1) in the South East Bight of Atlantis. These grounds tend to be more profitable 192 
than those on the steeper and more exposed West Coast but are also the nursery grounds of the round-fish 193 
species and hence the areas where more unwanted, undersized fish are caught and discarded. The problem 194 
for Atlantean fishers is thus somewhat similar to that of the beam trawl flatfish fisheries of the Netherlands 195 
and Belgium where the main sole fishing areas overlap with the distribution of undersized plaice and sole 196 
and are close to their main harbours. 197 
To model this for Atlantean waters it is necessary first to acquire information on the distribution of fish by 198 
area by size. Area distributions of catch by species and effort are available at the STECF website (STECF 199 
i2017)3. This also provides estimates of total discard weight by species from past years but not their 200 
distribution by area. Consequently, not all the information needed for input to a model that operates at a 201 
subarea level is available in these existing data; e.g. there are no ICES rectangle data for discards by size 202 
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available by species and by fleet and gear. Hence other means need to be found to generate this 203 
information. This can be done by using research vessel survey data to give size distributions by ICES 204 
rectangle and by assuming logistic selection and functional forms for discarding for the relevant fleets. Best 205 
fits of the operational 50% selection and discarding points may then be estimated by comparing past 206 
estimates of overall catches and discards from the fishery with those based on combining survey based 207 
catch-rates-at-size and selection patterns with commercial catch and effort distributions. Once these 50% 208 
points have been estimated (or guessed), the ratio of discards to catch can then be estimated for each 209 
rectangle using the selection pattern and the survey data. Further details of these calculations can be found 210 
in Zope, i2016. 211 
In the case of the Atlantean example unwanted catches are those below the earlier EU minimum landing 212 
sizes and knife-edged discarding at these sizes was assumed. Fall ground-fish survey estimates of the size 213 
distributions of cod, haddock and saithe were available from surveys conducted by R.V. Randomia that are 214 
available on the ICES DATRAS database (ICES i2018). Using these data sources it was possible to establish 215 
annual average catch-rates-by-size for each rectangle in Atlantean waters for all three species. These were 216 
split into three size bands corresponding to unwanted (zero valued and currently discarded) sizes, lower 217 
value smaller sizes and more valuable larger sizes. These correspond closely in distribution to the charts of 218 
large and small cod, haddock and saithe seen in the Atlantean Annex to the very informative Atlas of Fish 219 
(Hessen et al, i2015)4. 220 
Having estimated the areal distributions of the three species by the three size groups (unwanted, small and 221 
large fish), an initial very simple spreadsheet model was constructed to optimize profit (under hypothetical 222 
compliant or non-compliant behaviours) by modifying fleet fishing distribution over the fishable rectangles 223 
and by modifying mesh-size (subject to their being greater or equal the EU mandated 120cm) so as to catch 224 
differing proportions of discards, and of small and large commercial fish.  225 
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Catch proportions appropriate to a mesh size were based upon a logistic selection curves using the previous 226 
average fish sizes of the catch of each of the three size components for each species. Costs of a day’s fishing 227 
(the unit of effort adopted) and the average additional costs of steaming to different grounds were 228 
ascribed to each rectangle. This enabled the costs to be calculated of expending a given number of days 229 
fishing in each rectangle. The catch value of each size of each species was then combined with the 230 
calculated catch rates of each size and species in each rectangle. This enabled the catch value of a given 231 
number of days fishing at each rectangle to be calculated. Profit for such effort was then calculated as the 232 
difference of the calculated fishing costs and catch values for each rectangle and summed to give a total 233 
profit. Total catches of each species were also calculated for each rectangle and summed to give the total 234 
catch. Fishing effort was also summed across all rectangles. 235 
Optimizations of the fleet effort distribution by rectangle and of the average mesh size that maximized 236 
profit were made using the SOLVER optimizing routine of EXCEL . This enabled optimizations to be suitably 237 
constrained to the TAC landings of each species and also constrained to limit (in line with Atlantean 238 
customs) the total effort per rectangle. Optimizations were made under the two extreme hypotheses of 239 
fishers’ behaviour. Under the first hypothesis all fishers are compliant while under the second hypothesis 240 
all fishers are non-compliant. The simulations were subject to the following rules.  241 
 Under the compliance hypothesis all fish (unwanted and small and large commercial sized fish) are 242 
landed and all landed fish count equally towards binding species TAC’s.  243 
 Under the non-compliance hypothesis, zero value fish and over quota commercial sized fish are 244 
discarded if this allows greater profit. This would be possible because there is presently little at sea 245 
inspection. However, the same TACs are still binding on landings as under the compliant 246 
hypothesis. This is because all landings pass through Atlanto Porto (Atlantis’ only fishing harbour 247 
and fish market situated in the South Eastern Bight) where landings are subject to strict monitoring. 248 
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 In both cases the fleet, if it wishes, may increase mesh size and change fishing patterns and effort 249 
to obtain the most profitable outcome.  250 
 There is a longstanding industry-backed rule that statistical rectangles are closed after a maximum 251 
annual effort of 16665 days fishing (long supported by religious taboo but now also monitored by 252 
satellite). 253 
In both cases the optimization of effort by rectangle and mesh size leads to estimates of overall profit, 254 
overall days fishing, species catch and value by size group and actual levels of discards or landed discard 255 
sized fish. Overall profit reflects the value of catch and the immediate costs of applying effort and also 256 
indirect costs such as increases in steaming time for more distant grounds. 257 
3 Results 258 
Summary of the Initial Report of the MareFrame Atlantean Case Study to the ABC (ABC i2018).  259 
3.1 Areal Distributions. 260 
The report shows the annual fish areal distribution for the mature, immature and juvenile (i.e. below MLS ) 261 
fish. The full results are available in the report annex tables. For illustrative purposes Figures 2 to 4 are 262 
shown here for the immature size group of each species. Distributions of juvenile, immature and mature 263 
distributions are available in ABC i2018 - annex 3. Here these are referred to as unwanted catch and as, 264 
small and large commercial fish. Figure 2 shows the relative catch-rate per day of small cod. Note that 265 
larger cod (not shown) tend to lie further offshore while smaller unwanted sizes (not shown) are found 266 
further inshore. 267 
Figure 3 shows the relative catch-rate per day of small haddock. Larger sizes of haddock (not shown) and 268 
smaller unwanted sizes (not shown) have very similar distributions to these. 269 
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Figure 4 shows the relative catch-rate per day of small saithe. Larger saithe (not shown) tend to lie much 270 
deeper while smaller unwanted sizes (not shown) occur very close to the coast. 271 
3.2 Model Results.  272 
More detailed results from the optimization program are shown in (ABC i2018 - annex 4). Here we show 273 
Figures 5 and 6 that indicate relative fishing effort by rectangle for the two hypotheses. Note that there are 274 
markedly different distributions for the two hypotheses, and that non-compliance allows more fishing days. 275 
Table 1 shows the broad differences between the compliant and non-compliant behaviours. The Table 276 
shows that with non-compliance the hours fished, the landings value and the profit are all increased by 277 
about one third and discarded catch by 43%. The cost of compliance is thus estimated at about €4.4million, 278 
i.e. the profit forgone by complying. The implications are that fishing mortality rate would be about 1/3 279 
higher under the non-compliant hypothesis than the compliant hypothesis. Thus if the former is what will 280 
actually happen then the EBFM objective of bringing fishing mortality rate on all species down to the Fmsy 281 
level would be severely compromised and by extension so would EBFM.   282 
4 Discussion and Conclusions 283 
4.1 Stakeholder Discussions. 284 
On receiving this report the Fisheries Secretary of the ABC convened a meeting with the members of the 285 
Atlantis Regional Advisory Council (ARAC) to discuss both the initial report and possible ways forward. The 286 
meeting was held under Chatham House rules.  287 
The Mareframe Atlantean Case study leader Dr Zope presented the report and stressed that it in no way 288 
claimed that Atlantean fishers engaged in non-compliant behaviour, but it simply tried to estimate the size 289 
of the potential driver for non-compliant behaviour under the proposed LO. He noted that under the non-290 
compliant hypothesis: 291 
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 There would be a 35% greater fishing effort and presumably concomitant increases in fishing 292 
mortality with non-compliance 293 
 Capture of unwanted catch/discards might increase particularly for saithe. 294 
 Profit might be 33% higher. 295 
 That at €4.4million the wages of sin are substantial!  296 
 He also noted the overall increase in profit from non-compliance (33%) was less than expected by 297 
some NGO commentators in a year where high haddock discards were anticipated.  298 
Discussions of the report by members of the ARAC were later described as frank and comradely6! The main 299 
points were: 300 
 There were various accusations by various fleet sectors about other fleet sectors’ lack of 301 
compliance in the past! This was echoed by the NGO delegates attending, but then denied by all 302 
fleet sectors! 303 
 With respect to the report many ARAC members were suspicious of areal distributions of catch rate 304 
based upon research vessel data, which did not reflect real fish catch rates by real fishers. 305 
 In particular, changing seasonal distributions of smaller sizes was considered likely to be important. 306 
Local fishermen who know their fishing grounds very well were particularly vocal on this point 307 
 These fishermen argued that catch composition varies greatly on a very fine scale in space and 308 
time, if you know what you are doing you could thus avoid discarding.  309 
  All the fishermen pointed out they had been shown to be right about such issues in the past. 310 
 Various opinions of the scale of the economic advantage of non-compliance were expressed but 311 
most were not wildly dissimilar to those estimated by the model. 312 
 NGOs noted that the non-compliant effort distributions tended to concentrate in areas with 313 
sensitive habitats. 314 
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 Stakeholders expressed concerns regarding the reliability of the model outcomes and the 315 
associated uncertainties. 316 
Dr Zope accepted the more serious criticisms of the report while pointing out that it represented an 317 
estimate the worst case scenario for the cost of compliance that was designed as a “straw man” to initiate 318 
the discussion.  319 
From his own experience on chartered fishing vessels he had always been in awe of fishers’ ability to catch 320 
clean catches when they “chose to”.  The important question would be to find ways to encourage them to 321 
choose to be compliant with the Landings Obligation. He note that the analysis was designed to provide a 322 
worst case scenario for discussion. The non-compliant case of course was based upon the historical 323 
behaviour of the fishery and reflected how fishers had chosen to fish in the past. This presumably was the 324 
pattern of fishing that was most profitable to them. Discard data confirmed and fishermen themselves 325 
acknowledged that extensive discarding had occurred in the past and would presumably still occur in the 326 
future if fishers maintained past (short term profitable) patterns of fishing. Thus he said the question 327 
should be –“are there patterns of fishing, which based upon the undoubted skills of fishers, would allow 328 
compliant fishing to be undertaken in a fashion, which caused less profit to be foregone that that seen in 329 
the non-compliant scenario presented?” 330 
Dr Zope stated he would be very willing to improve the input to the model using industry knowledge of fish 331 
distributions if these could be provided. He said this would be helpful since RV Randomia was only able to 332 
make one Autumn Ground-Fish survey each year and he accepted that its’ young fish catches would not 333 
describe annual distributions accurately. Far more importantly such a collaborative study should also help 334 
identify behaviours that should be encouraged both by the Government of Atlantis and the fishers 335 
themselves in order to decrease discarding, to improve the long term state of the fishery by working “with 336 




The Fisheries Secretary of the ABC thanked Dr Zope for his initial “thought provoking” report and for the 339 
offer to improve it using industry knowledge. He proposed a small joint working group formed of Dr Zope 340 
and experienced members of ARAC to foster trust and increase transparency. This group would explored 341 
the fishers knowledge that could improving both the details of the model and more importantly help come 342 
up with proposals for action in the traditional spirit of cooperative fisheries management native to Atlantis. 343 
He asked them to provide an interim report for the next meeting in two months’ time. He noted that 344 
despite caveats about the inputs there seemed broad agreement about the scale of the economic 345 
advantage of non-compliance, at round about 33% extra profit, and that this might constitute a serious 346 
temptation to non-compliant behaviour to some. He was concerned to help fishers to resist temptation7 in 347 
the interests of the long-term sustainability of the resource. He asked for suggestions of ways to curb non-348 
compliant behaviour while noting that an increased offshore inspection regime would be expensive and 349 
probably ineffective. The ensuing discussion produced (inter alia) the following useful suggestions: 350 
 Introduce a targeted inspection of inshore waters.  351 
 Encourage industry reporting of areas of high undersized catch. 352 
 Instigate industry led temporary closures in areas of high discarding.  353 
 Further encourage a social inclusion policy in decision making (this might serve to encourage 354 
compliance with the LO). 355 
 Involve women more as at sea observers (perhaps under the aegis of the High Priestess). 356 
 Find ways to compensate the landing of undersized fish with a general levy. 357 
 Improve heavy fines for discarding. 358 
 Empower fishery participants and increase regulation legitimacy by creating ownership and 359 
acceptance through co-creation processes (to increase rule uptake). 360 
                                                          
7
 Noting that some like Oscar Wilde could ”Resist anything except temptation” 
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 Identify possible other factors leading to non-compliant behaviour and ways to mitigate them 361 
through interdisciplinary (i.e. involving natural and social sciences) and trans-disciplinary efforts 362 
(i.e. involving academic and non-academic participants).  363 
 Foster the use of decision support frameworks that can highlight alternatives and consequences to 364 
stakeholders.  365 
 Build trust through transparency and openness during scientific/planning/decision-making 366 
processes. 367 
The Fisheries Secretary thanked the meeting for their suggestions. He noted it was important to reach an 368 
early solution to avoid non-compliant behaviour becoming widespread, socially acceptable and entrenched. 369 
This is important because non-compliance could increase fishing mortality on these species by 35%, 370 
discards would increase by 43% and bottom disturbance would increase on some vulnerable grounds. He 371 
advised that he would return next month to discuss practical measures with the ARAC. He stressed that 372 
Atlantean traditions lead him to prefer measures that worked “with the grain” of the fishing industry rather 373 
than to adopt a command and control approach. 374 
4.2 Back to reality 375 
To conclude: While the Atlantis case study is fabulous8, it suggests that estimating the cost of compliance 376 
(the profit forgone by complying) with any proposed measure would be a useful statistic for any fishery. In 377 
regard to non-compliance with the Landing Obligation it should be noted that non-compliance would 378 
increase fishing mortality rate on all sizes of fish but particularly undersized fish. The increased fishing 379 
mortality rate would mean that EBFM targets such as achieving Fmsy would be compromised. Increases in 380 
discards would be a point of concern for any implementation of EBFM. Discarding is directly related to 381 
EBFM as it can affect the functioning of ecosystems and reduce long term fisheries profits(Bellido et al., 382 
2011). Moreover, under a Landings Obligation where discarding is illegal it would become far more difficult 383 
                                                          
8
Fabulous should of course be understood here as mythical, from the word fable. 
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to monitor discarding accurately and thus it might go largely undetected.  384 
Estimating the difference in potential profit between compliant and non-compliant behaviours appears a 385 
good place to start in compliance studies in order to get a first impression of the pressure on fishers to 386 
evade regulation. At least the initial modelling stages used in Atlantis seem a feasible approach for non-387 
fabulous fisheries. This is demonstrated in Figure 7, showing estimates of potential plaice discard 388 
proportions estimated for small mesh beam trawl (BT2) fisheries in the North Sea. These were kindly 389 
calculated by Dr Zope pers. comm. following the same procedure used for Atlantean Waters fisheries.  390 
Clearly, effective ways to discourage non-compliance are needed since it seems likely that non-compliance 391 
would weaken all forms of fisheries management including EBFM. Hence effective measures to reduce or 392 
eliminate non-compliance with a Landings Obligation must be an urgent requirement particularly when 393 
there is a strong profit motivation in favour of non-compliance with this measure. At sea inspection is costly 394 
and may have insufficient deterrent value to eliminate non-compliant behaviour unless it is coupled with 395 
punitive fines or confiscation of fishing rights. Moreover it is likely to alienate fishers. Consequently more 396 
successful approaches might be those that use social pressures amongst fishers themselves to discourage 397 
discarding and/or which use fishers detailed knowledge in ways that finds less unprofitable solutions to 398 
avoiding discarding. 399 
Such an approach to the problem would be more in tune with EBFM.  EBFM aims to improve conventional 400 
decision making frameworks by increasing leverage from stakeholders (Link, 2010). This could be achieved 401 
by adding active stakeholder involvement and co-creation in the form of working groups (or other similar 402 
events) to the process, which offers room for discussion and the inclusion of Stakeholder perspectives.  403 
While such processes build trust, they can also provide insights into possible issues of peer pressure, 404 
legitimacy, and transparency. In addition, they offer the opportunity to include trade-offs and concerns 405 
relevant to stakeholders, which can make the scientific approach more relevant and also increases the 406 
likelihood of its acceptance among the participants (Epstein et al., 2018). To achieve this the Stakeholders 407 
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involved should be diverse and include fishers, managers, and representatives of other relevant sectors and 408 
institutions associated with the resource use to ensure a fair co-creation process (Ballesteros et al., 2018). 409 
Subsequently, a combined modelling and stakeholder involvement approach could potentially support 410 
resource assessments (e.g. by fishers sharing data with scientists to facilitate model interpretation 411 
(Ramírez-Monsalve et al., 2016)) and help to develop appropriate management measures and responses to 412 
non-compliant behaviour. The Sustainable Fisheries Resource Advisory Council of Canada (SFRACC)9, a 413 
national arm’s-length advisory body designed to offer the Minister broad-based advice and 414 
recommendations on fisheries issues might form a useful template for such a body. 415 
For successful EBFM and long-term sustainability for the resource and resource users, further consideration 416 
should be given to the complexity of fishers’ motivations for non-compliance as well as the socio-ecological 417 
context in which they interact. The inclusion of social scientists could help provide the necessary approach 418 
together with insights to gain a deeper understanding of the drivers and factors influencing fisher 419 
behaviour. However, the necessary extent of such an endeavour would depend on the type and context of 420 
the fishery (e.g. geographical location, scale of fishery, gear type, etc.) and the extent of the problem (e.g. 421 
high/low compliance). Early stakeholder involvement and consultation would help support the framing of 422 
the problem and aid the process of delving deeper into the complexities of fisher’s compliance. 423 
 424 
  425 
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7 Tables 487 
Table 1 Main results of the preliminary Mareframe Case Study into compliance costs. (Results from ABC 488 
i2018 reproduced by kind permission of ABC.) 489 
Behaviour Compliant Non-compliant % increase 
total days fished 4610 6240 35% 
landed wt. 1000 Tonnes 39 37 -4% 
landed value million€ 39 52 34% 
costs million€ 25 34 35% 
profit million€ 14 18 33% 
total discards 1000 
Tonnes 
12 17 43% 
Cod  discards 1000 T. 4 5 45% 
Haddock discards 1000T. 6 7 22% 
Saithe discards 1000T. 2 4 71% 
8 Figure Headings 490 
Figure 1. The lid off Atlantis topography and bathymetry. View from South East. 491 
Figure 2. The spatial distribution of relative catch per day of small cod. (Figure from Zope i2016) 492 
Figure 3. Relative catch per day of small haddock. (Figure from Zope i2016) 493 
Figure 4. Relative catch per day of small saithe. (Figure from Zope i2016) 494 
Figure 5. Relative days fished per rectangle with compliance with the landing obligation. (Results from ABC 495 
i2018 reproduced by kind permission of ABC.) 496 
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Figure 6. Relative days fished per rectangle with non-compliance with the landing obligation. (Results from 497 
ABC i2018 reproduced by kind permission of ABC.) 498 
Figure 7. Estimates of potential plaice discard proportions estimated for small mesh beam trawl fisheries in 499 
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